

~~SECRET~~

REF ID: A771926

1 November 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard Lehman
Deputy to the DCI for National Intelligence

SUBJECT : Status Report -- Competitive Analysis

1. The status -- as of 1 November -- of the substantive work of the "B" teams remains as described in the memorandum you forwarded to the NIE 11-3/8-76 working groups and others on 19 October. The "A" and "B" team drafts have been exchanged and the teams are preparing for the direct discussions with their counterparts during the week of 1 November. Mr. Stoertz and I have discussed procedures for these meetings and I have covered the same ground with the "B" team leaders. All seem to agree that the meetings will be most profitable if they are focussed closely on points of evidence, methodology, textual clarification, and factual accuracy and completeness. It was also agreed that all important areas of disagreement be clearly identified at these meetings to prevent subsequent misunderstandings or surprises.

2. Mr. Stoertz and I are planning on meetings of about two hours for each set of teams, though there is some time allowed for possible spillover. The "B" teams seem doubtful that one afternoon for each meeting will allow enough time to adequately cover the topic, but are willing to try to keep to that limit.

3. Beyond that, there are a few potential problem issues I would like to make you aware of. These include some which have already been raised with me and others which seem likely to arise. For each of them I will need some guidance. I will first identify them and then discuss them separately. They include:

- The wish of the "B" teams for access to the entire 11-3/8 draft, and not just their counterpart chapters.
- The "B" teams' plans to prepare recommendations on both methodology and organization for producing estimates for submission to PFIAB.

25X1

MORI/CDF

~~SECRET~~

- The possibility that some of the "A"/"B" discussions will turn on evidence from the blue line material. This is certainly likely in the NFIB discussion.
- A request by Dr. Pipes -- which was turned down by the NSC staff -- for access to the Brezhnev note to President Nixon during the Yom Kippur War. Dr. Pipes has asked that I raise the issue to a higher level.
- A concern on my part that if the date for NFIB consideration of the estimate slips very far into December, the experiment could be driven into cost overruns I have not projected.
- A request by Dr. Pipes and Ambassador Weiss that copies of the drafts on strategic policy -- Chapter I -- be made available to Weiss at his Embassy in the Bahamas.

4. Dr. Pipes group in particular feels that it must have the entire estimate draft available for study because they consider that evidence on Soviet programs and capabilities is central to an understanding of their strategic policies and objectives. They argue that the "A" team for Chapter I obviously has available to it the other chapters. There is some weight behind this point. Dr. Herbst and Dr. Lerch have also raised the question of reading other materials but I don't feel they are on particularly firm ground. For example, the Cherne/Bush correspondence on this point states, "Once all drafts are completed . . . each "B" team will be given access to all portions of the basic estimate draft relating to that "B" team's area of concentration." (Emphasis added.)

5. The question of whether the "B" teams were to submit recommendations with their written comments on the estimate draft was not addressed in the correspondence establishing the procedures. Dr. Pipes asked Mr. Galvin for clarification on that point, and Mr. Galvin said that this would be up to the "B" teams to decide. He also said that the Board would of course consider any recommendations offered. It is now my understanding that the three "B" teams do plan to prepare a set of joint recommendations on points of methodology, procedures, and organization, and to submit them directly to PFIAB. I have not taken any position on this proposition other than to suggest that recommendations might not be appropriate for the "B" team drafts themselves, since they were not called for in the original Bush/Cherne agreement.

If this situation seems troublesome to you, you might want to raise it with either Mr. Bush or Mr. Galvin.

6. I suspect that some substantive issues relating to the blue line DDO materials will come up either at the "A"/"B" team discussions or at the NFIB meeting which considers the estimate. I have exposed these materials directly to Dr. Pipes and Tom Wolfe, and of course General Graham has seen them in the past. The rest of Dr. Pipes group is aware that there is a body of sensitive human source material they have not seen, but that is all they know and they have not -- except for Van Cleave -- asked to see the material itself. As I told you earlier, the DDO has given me discretionary authority to brief the team more fully if I needed to do so, but I have so far held to the more restrictive line. My present feeling is that we have to be prepared to broaden the access if the situation otherwise threatens to become awkward, but at this time it is best to sit tight and just wait and see. 25X1

7. The request by Dr. Pipes for the Brezhnev note to President Nixon [redacted] 25X1
[redacted] is related to a point of contention between Pipes and his team. [redacted]

[redacted] Dr. Pipes would simply like to read the text -- not have a retention copy -- and he would be willing to go to the EOB to read it if necessary. When I told him my request had been turned down, he asked me to try once more. As the question at issue is only in Dr. Pipes' mind, the document doesn't need to be seen by others on his team. This seems to me to be a small point -- both on the part of Dr. Pipes and the NSC Staff -- and I doubt that it will have any effect on the end product. But if the NSC decision is to be questioned it will need to be done either at Mr. Bush's or your level.

8. It now looks as though the date NFIB will consider the 11-3/8-76 estimate will certainly slip into December, perhaps even to the second or third week. This will make additional time available to the "B" teams to work on improving their drafts, and I foresee that they will want to do so. Under such circumstances, my cost projections could be invalidated and I can calculate possible overruns on the order of [redacted] unless I continue my stand that overruns are not allowable. This

25X1

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

could be awkward and I only ask now that you consider it so we can deal with it when and if it arises.

9.. The final point -- whether the "A" and "B" drafts of Chapter I can be made available to Ambassador Weiss at his Embassy in the Bahamas -- just came up last Friday. Both Pipes and Weiss have urged me to accommodate them on this point, and I have said only that I would see what could be done, but that it looked doubtful. Ambassador Weiss said that his storage facilities included a vault with standard safes inside it, and with a 24 hour a day Marine guard. He also said that if [redacted] [redacted] 25X1

[redacted] could fly down and back for just one day with the documents it would be of great help. I have made some initial enquiries through [redacted] who believes the situation would call for quite unorthodox procedures unless we were to formally go through the State Department courier service. 25X1

25X1

[redacted]
NIO Coordinator, Competitive Analysis

~~SECRET~~